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Identifying Critical Junctures in Macroeconomic Policy - The Cases of
Mexico and Sweden in the Early 1980s
Ana Ligia Haro Maza and John Hogan*
Dublin Institute of Technology, Aungier Street, Dublin 2, Ireland
Abstract: This paper utilizes a new critical junctures framework to help understand the nature of the changes in macroeconomic policy. The framework consists of three elements which must be identified in sequence to be able to declare,
with some certainty, if an event was a critical juncture. These are crisis, ideational change, and radical policy change. Utilizing the critical juncture framework, we will determine whether changes to Mexican and Swedish macroeconomic policy
in the early 1980s constituted clean breaks with the past, or were continuations of previously established policy pathways,
and why that was.
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INTRODUCTION
We employ the critical juncture framework developed by
Hogan and Doyle [1]. According to this, a critical juncture
consists of crisis, ideational change, and radical policy
change (see Fig. 1). The framework rests upon the hypothesis that a crisis induced consolidation of a new idea – replacing an extant idea – can lead to significant policy change.
The framework can explain why certain crises lead to critical
junctures in policies whereas others do not, as the differentiating factor between them was ideational change. The
framework contests that in the absence of ideational change
the level of policy change, in response to a crisis, can be of
the first or second order, but not the third.1 Policy instrument
settings, and the instruments themselves, may change, but
without ideational change the hierarchy of goals underpinning a policy will remain unaltered. Ideational change is the
intermediating variable between a crisis and the subsequent
nature of policy change in response to that crisis.

Fig. (1). Critical juncture approach.

This framework has been used to examine changes in
macroeconomic policy in America, Britain, and Ireland, and
privatisation policy in Brazil and Argentina. In this case, the
macroeconomic difficulties affecting both Mexico and Sweden at the start of the 1980s will be examined to see if they
*Address correspondence to this author at the Dublin Institute of Technology, Aungier Street, Dublin 2, Ireland; E-mail: john.hogan@dit.ie
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Here the model borrows from Hall’s (1993) concept of first, second and third order
change.
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constituted crises, and, if so, did these crises lead to changes
in the ideas underpinning macroeconomic policy, and the
subsequent nature of the change in Mexican and Swedish
macroeconomic policy. Were the macroeconomic policies in
Mexico and Sweden in the early 1980s a continuation of, or
break with, the past?
THE CHARACTERISTICS AND USES OF THE
CRITICAL JUNCTURES APPROACH
Critical junctures are seen as branching point that set
processes of institutional, or policy change, in motion. A
critical juncture occurs when a new institution/policy is created, or when an extant institution/policy changes completely. The literature sees critical junctures resulting in the
adoption of an institutional arrangement from among alternatives [2]. Thereafter, the pathway established funnels units in
a particular direction [3, 4].
For some, a critical juncture constitutes a brief period in
which one direction or another is taken, while for others, it is
an extended period of reorientation [5]. The concept has
been employed in comparative politics. Critical juncture
frameworks have been used in the analyses of Latin America
[5, 6]. For them critical junctures took decades to occur. In
relation to short term change, Garrett and Lange [7: p. 628]
showed that electoral landslides created critical junctures by
producing mandates for policy change. Casper and Taylor
[8] employed the concept in analysing liberalisation of
authoritarian regimes, while Hogan’s [9, 10] remoulded
framework was used to examine change in trade union influence over public policy. Karl [11] employed the concept in
analyzing how “petro-states” became locked into problematic development pathways, while Flockhart [12] used critical junctures to explain the gap between the Danish population and their political elites’ attitudes towards the European
Union.
Critical junctures highlight the importance of the past in
explaining the present.
2009 Bentham Open
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THE COUNTRIES SELECTED FOR EXAMINATION
Mexico and Sweden were selected for examination based
upon most similar and most different criteria. For most similar we chose the criteria of having long-standing democracies and advanced capitalist states. They are most different
according to Lijphart’s [13] categories of majoritarian and
consensual democracies, allowing us to control for varying
institutional arrangements. Both countries’ economies were
very different, while their performances, and the policies
governing them, have varied dramatically. Their geographic
locations also provide for a global encompassing contrast.
Thus, their similarities ensure “the contexts of analysis are
analytically equivalent to a significant degree,” while their
differences place “parallel processes of change in sharp relief” [14: p. 2].
POLICY CHANGE AND ITS IDENTIFICATION
Policy change is complex, and must be seen in the context of societal and political change [15]. Utilizing Hogan
and Doyle’s [1] framework, we examine change in Mexican
and Swedish macroeconomic policy in the early 1980s in
discrete stages. The first stage examines the economy to see
if it was in crisis. A crisis implies that prevailing policy cannot be sustained without deterioration [16]. An economic
crisis, therefore, can influence policy preferences [17]. To
test for an economic crisis we develop observable implications.
The framework’s second stage tests for ideational
change. New ideas can change the policy environment [18].
But, how ideas influence policy is something theorists have
long grappled with [19]. This gives rise to questions: where
do ideas come from? How do they relate to failing policies?
And, why do the ideas underlying a failing policy sometimes
change, resulting in policy change, whereas at other times
they remains unaltered, resulting in policy continuation? To
answer this, a second set of observables, based on Legro
[20], are set out.
The framework’s third stage tests for policy change. Here
our observables are based upon the work of Hall [21], tying
together the concepts of policy change, societal learning, and
the state. Thus, each stage employs observable implications
incorporating aspects of societal and political change.
Testing for a Macroeconomic Crisis
Scholars regularly ‘agree that severe recessions make
significant structural changes possible as they render politics
highly fluid’ [22: p. 522]. However, economic crises are
rare, rendering definition and identification difficult [23: p.
439]. How do we identify a crisis? Stone [24: p. 299] argues
that a situation does not become a problem until it is controllable. But, if something is controllable it must be measurable, otherwise how would we know if we are controlling it?
Thus, even economic crises must be quantifiable.
Kaminsky, et al., [25] and Berg and Pattillo [26] advocated examining individual variables when quantifying currency crises. Pei and Adesnik [27: pp. 138-139] developed a
broader range of criteria for identifying macroeconomic crises: annual inflation greater than 15 percent, stagnant annual
gross domestic product (GDP), and historians and other analysts’ descriptions of significant deterioration in economic
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circumstances. Frankle and Rose [28: p. 351] define a “macroeconomic crisis” as a stagnant economy, where investment
is in decline, inflation, interest rates, and unemployment are
above 15 percent, and various actors perceive the economy
to be in crisis. For Garuba [29: p. 21], Kwon [30: p. 105],
and Solimano [31: p. 76] a macroeconomic crisis can be
identified through general indicators and perceptions of
growth, inflation, employment creation, and poverty.
We seek to identify macroeconomic crises through quantitative and qualitative measures. Defining anything as a crisis, including a macroeconomic downturn, requires subjective and objective deliberations [27: p. 39]. Consequently,
González [32: p. 93] suggests adopting a multifaceted approach. Agents must diagnose, and impose on others, their
notion of a crisis before collective action to resolve uncertainty can take meaningful form [33: p. 9]. This fits with
Hay’s [34: p. 321] perception of a crisis as the triumph of a
simplifying ideology.
Thus, we develop a range of observable implications,
which build upon previous studies [1]. They seek to identify
change in nominal economic performance as well as in perceptions of economic health.
O1.

If GDP growth was stagnant/negative, the economy
may have been in crisis.

O2.

If total debt as a percentage of GNI was above 100
percent, the economy may have been in crisis.

O3.

If inflation was above 15 percent [27], the economy
may have been in crisis.

O4.

If the interest rate was above 15 percent, the economy
may have been in crisis.

O5.

If the unemployment rate was above 15 percent, the
economy may have been in crisis.

O6.

If opinion polls find the public regarded the economic
in crisis, then the economy may have been in crisis.

O7.

If the national media regarded the economy in crisis,
then the economy may have been in crisis.

O8.

If economic and political commentators regarded the
economy in crisis, then the economy may have been
in crisis.

O9.

If the central bank regarded the economy in crisis,
then the economy may have been in crisis.

O10. If both domestic and international organisations
monitoring economic performance regarded the
economy in crisis, then the economy may have been
in crisis.
O11. If elected representatives regarded the economy in
crisis, then the economy may have been in crisis.
O12. If government pronouncements on the economy were
consistent with a crisis management approach, then
the economy may have been in crisis.
Mexico – Potential Crisis 1981-1983
After the Second World War Mexico sought growth
through import substitution [35]. Domestic industries were
developed behind import quotas [36, 37]. This increased the
country’s international trade, while decreasing its foreign
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dependence. However, Hernandez [38] pointed out competitiveness was not crucial for Mexican businesses, as the internal market was closed to foreign competition. Nevertheless,
the model succeeded as there was a strong demand for Mexican raw materials. Hernandez [38] argued that Mexico’s
policies created a private sector with a mercantile mentality,
that came to depend upon state protection.
Under President Echeverria’s (1970-1976) poor decisions
drove the economy into recession [35]. Serra-Puche [39]
remarked that the Echeverria administration permitted fiscal
and monetary discipline to collapse. This marked the exhaustion of the policy know as “stabilising development”. Mexico’s import substitution could not compete with global
manufacturers such as Japan. Rubio [40] put the failures of
stabilising development down to falling agricultural exports,
rapid population growth, and a middle class disillusioned
with its inability to express itself in a one party (Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI)) dominated culture.
President Portillo (1976-1982) inherited a troubled economy [41]. However, huge oil reserves were discovered by
Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), the state oil company, in the
late 1970s [42]. The hope was that oil revenues would stabilise the economy. Interviewees pointed out that this discovery permitted extant policies to soldier on. However, the oil
boom only circumvented the dangers of immediate crisis,
without resolving the structural problems in the economy
[43]. Tournaud [44] argued this was evidence of the temporary solutions often sought by the Mexican political elite.
Tournaud [44] blamed this short-termism on the institutional
structure that permitted presidents only one term of office.
Once the country had become a net petroleum exporter
pressure grew to expand public spending. Mexico’s development strategy came to depend upon oil revenues. The
number of state owned enterprises quadrupled to 1,200 [42,
45]. Expenditure came to outstrip revenues derived from
petroleum and an anaemic taxation system [46]. To finance
these projects Mexico had borrowed $78bn. by 1981 [41].
This expenditure began to overheat the economy by the
late 1970s (Appendix A). By this time the state’s share of
fixed capital formation had increased to 50 percent [47: p.
277]. As inflation rose above 25 percent the peso became
overvalued, and the competiveness of exports, apart from oil,
diminished [48]. ‘The merchandise trade balance deteriorated’ as ‘imports rose while nonoil exports earning stagnated’ [49: p. 494].
Mexico was poorly positioned to resist the financial challenges of the early 1980s as oil prices fell in response to a
weakening world economy and a supply glut [50]. To compound matters, PEMEX and the Secretaría de Programación
y Presupuesto (SPP), published a report clarifying that oil
production would not be sufficient to reactivate the economy
[51]. Problems in the US meant that as interest rate increased
there, the money supply diminished. As Starr [52: p. 53] puts
it ‘collapsing oil prices and rising international interest rates
erased Mexico’s economic prosperity’. The result was that
foreign borrowing became a requirement to sustain expansion.
Higher US unemployment lowered demand for Mexican
goods. The sharp increase in US interest rates placed increas-
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ing pressure on Mexico’s debt servicing, as US banks had
lent the country some $25 billion. Servicing Mexico’s total
debt reached $16 billion, more than the country’s revenues
from oil [53: p. 89].
By 1982, as confidence in the economy waned, Mexicans
began converting pesos into dollars at up to 25 billion pesos
a day [54]. To reduce the flow of capital out of the economy
Banco de Mexico permitted the dollar price of the peso to
double. However, the gravity of the situation came to international attention on August 13, 1982, when:
The government fired the shot heard around the world,
announcing that it could not meet interest payments coming
due within the next few days and initiating negotiations for
bridge loans and rescheduling agreements with the US
Treasury, the IMF, and the private commercial banks [43: p.
97].
Mexico’s main economic indicators pointed towards a
crisis (Appendix A) [55]. GDP contracted by 0.6 percent in
1982 and a staggering 4.2 percent in 1983, while the rate of
inflation reached 58.92 percent in 1982 [56]. Unemployment
jumped towards 15 percent [57], while more than 20 million
people, more than half the workforce, were underemployed
[53: p. 92]. Output fell in all industries, mineral production
declined by 10 percent, auto production 20 percent, and agriculture 20 percent [57]. To compound matters US banks
stopped lending to Mexican companies as they already owed
over US$600 million in interest [58]. The budget deficit
stood at a staggering 16.5 percent of GDP [57].
In 1983 inflation reached triple digits, the national debt
and unemployment continued to rise, and the level of capital
formation slackened (Appendix A). Time Magazine pointed
to the dramatic devaluation of the peso against the dollar
[59]. According to Edwards [60: p. 17] this was the worst
crisis to hit Mexico since the Great Depression. The Third
World Magazine [61], Gestión y Estrategia [62], and Time
Magazine [63] referred to Mexico’s economic difficulties as
a crisis. The Economist regarded Mexico as the country most
affected by the crises of the 1980s [64]. Spanish newspaper
El País, stressed that Mexico’s crisis was partly due to the
policies of President Portillo [65]. Mexican economic magazine Proceso regarded the 1982 crisis as Mexico’s worst
recession [66].
Confidence in Mexico’s economy, and politicians,
evaporated. Hernandez [38] stated that the situation left the
country without financial security. The Third World Magazine argued the country was effectively bankrupt [67]. William Perry of Georgetown University observed that the crisis
was a sign that Mexico’s traditional political system was
decaying [57]. Minimum wages were insufficient to meet the
basic needs of most Mexican families. Prices for staples increased at least 400 percent at the beginnings of 1982, while
wages increased by just 300 percent [68]. Opinion polls
found great scepticism concerning the economy [69]. The
decision to nationalise the banks, to decrease foreign investors’ panic, and the continued speculation against the peso,
was a last desperate measure by President Portillo [70].
During 1982 the peso was devaluated twice [71]. The
hope was that devaluation might increase exports, but the
economy could not hold onto a sufficient amount of dollars
[72]. New short term loans were taken in an effort to coun-
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teract the capital flight, but, together with the peso’s devaluation, this did nothing [73]. Banco de Mexico’s reserves
dried up in a matter of weeks [74]. In his Sixth Annual
Presidential Report, Portillo stated that the economy was
going through the worst crisis in its history [75].

throughout the 1970s, had reach 3.1 percent in 1982, its
highest level since 1945. Although this would have been a
miniscule figure anywhere else, it was a political scandal in a
country accustomed to full employment [85: p. 3]. For
Swedes this was an unprecedented situation.

Sandersen [76] points to three issues that exacerbated
Mexico’s problems: (i) economic policy was directed by a
coalition of political leaders; (ii) stability of the PRI was
threatened by opposition parties; (iii) economic demands of
oil-rich Mexico could no longer be sustained by the policy
framework. Furthermore, Bailey [77: p. 54] identified four
trends that produced the economic panic: oil price
fall/excessive government outlays; $15.3 billion in shortterm loans which funded capital flight; overvalued peso; and
high dollarization.

However, some economists believed that the [unemployment] figure would have been closer to 16 percent if it
included the jobless who are in training programmes and
public work projects, workers who have been forced into
early retirement, and Swedes who have given up looking for
work [80: p. 32].

Under Portillo GDP grew at 8 percent annually from
1978 to 1981, one of the highest levels in the world. However, by the beginning of 1982, Mexico had run up a huge
national debt, and drastically devalued its currency. By the
end of 1982, Mexico faced one of the severest
macroeconomic crises in its history [78, 79].
Sweden – Potential Crisis 1981-1983
The recession that began in the mid-1970s, as a result of
the first oil shock, proved persistent. Central government’s
expenditures grew at a faster pace by the end of the 1970s
than they had at the beginning of that decade, while revenues
stagnated due to slow economic growth. The consequential
budget deficits were largely financed through borrowing
from abroad. However, there was no political mandate for
either radical budget cuts or revenue enhancements. The
non-socialists parties in government (Centre, Liberals and
Moderates) wanted neither to raise the level of taxes nor be
accused of trying to dismantle the social welfare state they
had only recently taken power over, after decades out in the
cold [80].
By 1982 the Swedish economy was in difficulty, with the
media, national commentators, domestic and international
organisations, and the central bank, all pointing this out.
With a sluggish national economy, stagnant revenues, and
rapidly rising expenditure, the government’s budget deficits
accelerated during the late 1970s, so that by 1982 they had
reached a very worrying 13 percent of GNP [81: p. 17]. The
Riksbank predicted that ‘the deficit on the national budget,
which the non-Socialist Government had struggled to contain over the pervious two years, would grow from around
SKr78 billion under the 1982-83 budget to some SKr90 billion in 1983-1984’ [82: p. 32]. ‘In an international context,
both the level of the budget deficit, and the swing in the
budget balance since the mid-1970s has been more pronounced than in most other OECD countries’ [83: p. 16]. By
1982 Sweden’s ratio of debt of GNP stood at 59.3 percent.
An indication of just how substantial the budget deficits
were can be ascertained from the fact that the debt to GNP
ratio had stood at 50.8 percent just 12 months before. In all,
the Swedish debt to GNP ratio had grown by over 250
percent in the space of just six years! The Economist [84: p.
41] observed that inflation was running at 8.6 percent in
1982, although significantly down on 1981’s rate of 12.1
percent, this figure was still very high for Sweden. Unemployment, having hovered at between 1.5 and 2 percent

Yet, apart from unemployment, and the debt to GNP ratio, none of the other indicators set out in Appendix B were
at decade-long lows. Economic growth, which had averaged
2.5 percent throughout the fluctuation economic conditions
of the 1970s, stood at a mere 1 percent in 1982, after in fact
contracting the previous year. Although only 2,000 days
were lost to industrial disputes in 1982, 209,000 had been
lost in 1981, while 4,478,000 days were lost in 1980 [86].
Nevertheless, in the context of the international recession of
the early 1980s, the large budget deficit prevented the government from pursuing a counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Consequently, Sweden had to accept the impact of recession
from abroad.
The Washington Post pointed out that at this time the
Swedish economy faced serious economic challenges [87: p.
A15]. ‘The country, like most in Europe, now suffers from
low growth, falling industrial output and an unfavourable
trade balance’ observed the New York Times [88: p. 17]. The
paper went on to argue that the Swedish economy, once the
envy of Europe, had been hobbled by its foreign debt, a low
rate of investment, an adverse balance of payments, and its
level of unemployment [85: p. 3]. The Financial Times
pointed out that Swedes were nervous about the future, and
reluctant to see their welfare state cut back and to accept the
tough remedies proposed to deal with their growing economic problems [89: p. 15]. “The welfare state is in a major
crisis of legitimacy,’ observed Hans Vetterberg, Sweden’s
leading pollster and public opinion analyst. ‘We can no
longer afford to keep expanding it the way we were” [87: p.
A15].
The OECD [83: p. 49] described the situation in the
Swedish economy in the spring of 1982 as difficult. Economic performance in the two years to mid-1982 had been
poor, this partly influenced by the weak international environment. Furthermore, in spite of the adjustment policies
pursued by the authorities, correction of the large imbalances
that had built up since the early 1970s was slow, and the
economy remained in a situation of marked disequilibrium
[90: p. 7]. Apart from maintaining a relatively good level of
employment the government’s economic policies were not
successful. The government’s budgetary position weakened
sharply, with the growth in public expenditures greatly outstripping that of the overall economy [90: p. 9]. The OECD
[90: p. 12] further pointed out that foreign competition had
made substantial inroads on the Swedish domestic market, as
suggested by the steady rise in the imported share of manufactured goods used domestically.
Ironically, the public sector’s share of GNP had risen
rapidly under the non-socialists, so that by 1982 public sec-
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tor expenditure constituted some 67 percent of GNP [91: p.
59]. That level of spending explained in part how the number
of jobs in the public sector could rise by 43 percent between
1972 and 1982, coming to outnumber jobs in private industry
after 1978 [92: p. 123]. Worryingly, Peterson [93: p. 33]
points out that Sweden’s share of the world economy
dropped by some 40 percent during the same ten-year period.
Labours’ productivity growth from about 1970 onwards was
markedly less impressive than prior to then. The sluggish
aggregate productivity growth in Sweden after 1970 was to
some extent the result of the large size of the public sector,
and labours’ slow productivity growth [94: p. 1312]. Thus,
by the 1980s, the Swedish economy, once the envy of
Europe, had been hobbled by crisis [85].
From Table 1 it is clear that the Mexican economy was in
crisis during the early 1980s, with all observable implications satisfied by our findings. It is also clear from Table 1
that Sweden, although it did not satisfy all observable implications, satisfied most - three-quarters. This information,
combined with the fact that the economic conditions existing
in Sweden at this time were totally out of context for that
society, and that there was much hidden unemployment,
leads us to declare that it too was in economic crisis in 1982.
The next section examines both countries for changes in the
ideas underlying macroeconomic policy at this time.
Table 1.

The Identification of Macroeconomic Crisis

The Observable Implications

Mex

Sw

O1. Was GDP growth stagnant.

X

X

O2. Was total debt above 100% of GNI?

X

O3. Was inflation above 15%?

X

O4. Was interest rate above 15%?

X

O5. Was unemployment above 15%?

X

O6. Opinion polls- economy in crisis?

X

X

O7. Media - economy in crisis?

X

X

O8. Econ/pol commentators - economy in crisis?

X

X

O9. Central bank - economy in crisis?

X

X

O10. Dom/ int orgs - economy in crisis?

X

X

O11. Reps - economy in crisis?

X

X

O12. Gov - crisis management approach?

X

X

Economic Crisis

Y

Y

X

Testing for Ideational Change
Previous policies can be discredited due to their implication in, or inability to right, a crisis [95]. Although economic
crises can have great impact they will not determine policy,
whose formulation is ‘centred in domestic political and ideational processes’ [96: p. 375]. Hogan and Doyle’s [1]
framework contends that significant policy change depends
upon actors reaching consensus upon, and subsequently consolidating around, a particular set of new ideas. This corresponds to McNamara’s [96: pp. 4-5] argument that actors
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utilize new ideas to chart policy strategy. ‘Ideas facilitate the
reduction of … barriers by acting as coalition-building resources among agents who attempt to resolve the crisis’ [33:
p. 37]. Ideas are the casual mechanisms of change in any
critical juncture [97]. Thus, ideational change stands between
a crisis and policy change, determining if a crisis will result
in policy change.
Hogan and Doyle’s [1] framework contents that new
ideas are introduced by three groups of change agents. Combinations of these agents constitute a policy network [21].
The most important are what Dahl [98] termed ‘political
entrepreneurs’. Political entrepreneurs ‘exploit moments of
instability’ and ‘invest resources in the creation of a new
policy, a new agency, or new forms of collective action’ [99:
pp. 188-190]. In a crisis, a political leader, usually an opposition leader, will seek out new ideas to rectify the ills of the
existing policy paradigm. The second group are Kingdon’s
[100: pp. 179-183] ‘policy entrepreneurs’. These are agents
who spread ideas to replace the current paradigm. They may
be civil servants, technocrats, academics, economists and
interest groups. The final group of change agents consists of
outside influences: the media, the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. They critique an
existing economic paradigm, advocating a new one. Both
policy entrepreneurs and outside influences are responsible
for producing ideas, but, political entrepreneurs introduce
ideas into the policy process.
According to Legro’s [20: p. 419] two-stage model of
ideational change, if agents agree the existing ideational
paradigm is deficient and should be replaced, the first stage –
ideational collapse – has occurred. These are the observables
for ideational collapse:
Ideational Collapse
O1.

The media questions the efficacy of the current
model/specific policy areas.

O2.

Opposition political parties critique the current model
and propose alternative ideas – at election time their
platform will be built around these alternatives.

O3.

Civil society organizations, e.g. labour unions, employer organizations, consumer groups etc. critique
the current model, reflecting Hall’s [21: p. 12] coalition-centred approach.

O4.

Widespread public dissatisfaction with the current
paradigm, observable through opinion polls, protests
etc.

O5.

External/international organizations critique the current model and/or actively disseminate alternative
ideas.

Agents will then propose a range of solutions, with one
main challenger to the dominant creed. However, ‘even
when ideational collapse occurs, failure to reach consensus
on a replacement could still produce continuity, as society
reflexively re-embraces the old orthodoxy’ [20: p. 424]. The
crucial issue is reaching consensus on a new set of ideas. If
consensus is achieved it marks the second stage of Legro’s
model – consolidation – agents coordinating a replacement
set of ideas. This can be seen in political entrepreneurs con-
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solidating innovations by combining a mixture of interests to
produce a winning coalition [99: pp. 192-193]. Oliver and
Pemberton [101] identified this process as policy learning.
Below are the observables for new ideational consolidation.
New Ideational Consolidation
O6.
A clear set of alternative ideas, developed by policy
entrepreneurs, are evident.
O7.
A clear change agent (political entrepreneur) injecting new ideas into the policy arena is evident.
O8.
The political entrepreneur combines a mixture of
interests to produce consensus around a replacement paradigm.
Policies are protected by underlying ideas [102]. The
greater the consensus encompassing an idea the more protected the policies derived from it. Protected policies represent continuity, whereby once a policy has become institutionally embedded, ‘policy-making becomes possible only in
terms of these ideas’ [103: p. 4]. Referring to policies as protected is similar to Golob’s notion of ‘policy frontiers’ [97:
363].
The Ideas Underlying Mexican Macroeconomic Policy
Populist-redistributive models were implemented by PRI
presidents between 1934 and 1976 [76: p. 319]. When Portillo came to office he was forced to contemplate reduced expenditure due to the economic downturn in the wake of the
oil crisis [103]. However, the discovery of vast oil reserves
changed everything, with Portillo adopting a patronage
model. This embraced trade expansion and liberalisation,
rapid industrialisation and expansive state expenditure [77].
Portillo’s continuation of the populist approach produced
high growth, however, the economy remained vulnerable.
Rather than pay the political price that sweeping redistributive policies-especially tax reform-would have entailed,
both the Echeverria administration (1970-1976) and the
Portillo administration (1976-1982) sought to expand the
entire economic pie and increase the role of the state in the
economy, as banker, entrepreneur, and employer [53: p. 88].
Despite oil revenues, the economy became fuelled on
foreign borrowing and declining real wages [104]. However,
once oil prices fell, and interest rates spiked, Mexico faced
the prospect of debt default. The ideas underlying extant
economic policy underwent a rethink. By mid March 1982,
President Portillo’s administration introduced a 12 point plan
to stabilise the economy [105].
During the 1982 presidential election all contenders focused on the crisis. Miguel De La Madrid, a fiscal conservative, was selected as PRI presidential candidate in September
1981 [106]. He was ‘among the leaders of the conservative
faction based in the treasury’ [43: p. 98]. The mechanics of
this selection process were hidden [76: p. 320], but it appears
that shifts in a more conservative direction within inner circles of the PRI led to the choice of De La Madrid [107].
Mexican society was in turmoil, and free market supporters
wanted a president who would support the rights of private
property [108]. In an interview Cárdenas [109] remarked that
the choice of De La Madrid marked a rupture within the PRI
from its revolutionary ideology. There was a feeling that the
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PRI, and traditional politics, was failing to meet the challenges confronting Mexican society.
During his campaign, De La Madrid stressed the differences between his proposed government and that of Portillo.
“Crises come about because the government tries to consolidate all interests at the same time...” declared De La Madrid
[110: pp. 1-2]. His proposed government would mobilise
resources to change the direction of the economy [110]. ‘In
the post-1982 environment, policy options and instruments
appeared limited [for Mexico], which as a debtor was subject
to the conditionality imposed by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF)’ [97: p. 375].
In his inauguration address De La Madrid declared opposition to populism and institutional corruption [53: p. 93]. He
stated that a new moral, political and economic approach
was needed [111]. Locked into a harsh IMF bailout, negotiated by the outgoing administration [112], De La Madrid
presented a detailed programme for policy change [113].
In his new approach to managing the economy, De La
Madrid, acting as a political entrepreneur, kept Silva-Herzog
in the treasury, and Miguel Mancera Aguayo in the Central
Bank [57], while selecting 11 new ministers from the conservative wing of the PRI [43: p. 95]. His aim was to take
policy to the right. In this regard, his cabinet broadly supported his measures to stabile and open the economy [114,
115: p. 28]. In Mexico access to the president was the only
means of influencing policy; thus policy entrepreneurs cultivated teams of loyal followers within various bureaucracies
[97: p. 383].
The De La Madrid administration had a limited range of
policy options. As Hernandez [38] stated, sources of external
finance dried up in the aftermath of the crisis, while oil revenues remained stagnant. Even when oil prices rose, the
Mexican oil industry did not have the capacity take advantage of this. Macroeconomic stabilisation became the priority
[116: p. 421]. These decisions were applied across all government policies [53: p. 107]. To maintain economic, political, and social order, a break with the past was required. The
De La Madrid administration gave priority to greater integration into the world economy by attracting foreign direct investment (FDI); and focusing on high tech industries.
The Ideas Underlying Swedish Macroeconomic Policy
In the spring of 1981 the non-socialist coalitions government and the opposition Social Democrats Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet (SAP) reached agreement on ways of
reducing marginal taxation. However, this agreement led to a
dispute within the coalition that saw the Moderates resign
from the government. Prime Minister Thorbjorn Fälldin
formed a new minority Government of the two middle parties (Centre and Liberal), his third Cabinet in five years.
Both of these parties had suffered losses in the general election of 1979, and between them held a total of only 102 of
the 350 seats in the Riksdag [117]. This minority government
hoped that its active program to combat Sweden’s economic
problems would generate respect for non-socialist policies.
However, declining popularity figures plagued the new administration [84]. A mounting central government budget
deficit, a negative balance of payments, and rising unemployment figures showed that the economic crisis was a reality [86: p. 7]. Swollen social welfare expenditures only
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added to the crisis. The welfare state was becoming dysfunctional for capital [118: p. 81). In the autumn of 1981 Sweden
carried out a 10 percent devaluation of the krona, and in the
spring of 1982 the non-socialist government introduced a
far-reaching austerity program. However, the opposition
Social Democrats gained ground while the two governing
parties noted the steady erosion of their popularity in the
opinion polls [119: pp. 129-130].
The 1982 election was deemed crucial as it would determine whether public support had shifted, as in Norway and
Denmark, away from the Social Democrats. The election
campaign was dominated by talk of economic crisis – a $10
billion debt to foreign banks, inflation, declining exports,
and increasing unemployment [87]. During the campaign the
Social Democrats under Olof Plame attacked the viability of
another non-socialist government, and their economic policies. The party presented a program on how Sweden could
save and work its way out of crisis. Ultimately, the election,
and the debates surrounding it, failed to generate either a
coherent set of alternative economic ideas to replace the existing ones, or a significant agent of change. The nonsocialist parties failed to create a coalition of interests around
ideas alternative to those of the welfare state. Nearly all economic ideas presented were variations on existing themes.
Despite the dominant orthodoxy’s failure society reflexively
re-embraced it as there was no political entrepreneur championing any viable alternatives developed by policy entrepreneurs. The ideas underpinning the policies of the welfare
state endured. The SAP won the election, not on the back of
a new economic paradigm that could cure the country’s
woes, but, on a series of proposals to correct existing economic arrangements.
Table 2.

The Identification of Ideational Change
Mex

Sw

O1. Media questioning efficacy of current model

X

X

O2. Opposition parties critique current model.

X

O3. Civil society organisations critique the current
model

X

O4. Widespread public dissatisfaction with current
paradigm

X

X

O5. Ext/int organisations critique current model

X

X

Y

Y

The Observable Implications
Ideational Collapse

New Ideational Consolidation
O6. A clear set of alternative ideas are evident

X

O7. A clear change agent

X

O8. Political entrepreneur combines interests to produce consensus

X

Adoption of New Idea

Y
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industrialisation, collapsed. Vast expenditure, based upon the
belief that oil revenues could support rapid industrialisation,
led the country to the brink of bankruptcy. De La Madrid,
acting as a political entrepreneur, implemented a new set of
ideas on how to manage the economy. These involved moving the economy away from import substitution, towards a
more open approach to international trade.
At this time Sweden was also experiencing unfulfilled
economic expectations, and change agents there were dissatisfied with the prevailing economic paradigm. This constituted extant ideational collapse. However, unlike in Mexico,
although extant ideas on how to manage the economy had
collapsed, in the wake of the economic crisis, change agents
in Sweden failed to consolidate around a replacement economic orthodoxy. One of the reasons for this failure was that
no political entrepreneur came forward to champion an alternative set of ideas to those underlying social democracy. The
result was that a new set of ideas on how to manage the
Swedish economy did not emerge in 1982.
Identification of Policy Change
McNamara [97] argues that new ideas change the wider
policy environment. The level of policy change depends
upon the preceding variables, but is also central to determining if there has been a critical juncture. We hypothesise that
once there is political entrepreneur led consolidation around
a new set of ideas policy change should follow. We argue
that ideational change constitutes the “differentiating factor”
between crises that result in radical policy change, and those
that do not. Therefore, we must discover if radical changes in
economic policy follow ideational change. The observable
implications used here are based upon Hall’s [21] concepts
of first, second, and third order policy change. Hall [21: p.
291] argued that exogenous shocks, and policy failures, discredit the old paradigm, leading a re-examination of the belief systems through which that policy was created – a paradigmatic change. He describes rare, but radical, and overarching changes in policy as third order changes. The observables set out below enable us identify, and differentiate,
the normal and fundamental shifts in macroeconomic policy.
They also incorporate the idea of swift and enduring change
[9].
O1.
If economic policy instrument settings changed
(swiftly and for longer than one government’s term of office)
there may have been a radical change in government
economic policy.
O2.
If the instruments of economic policy changed
(swiftly and for longer than one government’s term of office)
there may have been a radical change in government
economic policy.
O3.
If the hierarchy of goals behind economic policy
changed (swiftly and for longer than one government’s term
of office) then there may have been a radical change in
government economic policy.

N

From Table 2 it is clear In the case of Mexico ideational
change followed macroeconomic crisis. The ideas underpinning macroeconomic policy, focused on import substitution

Change in Mexican Macroeconomic Policy
The first policy response to the crisis came from the
Portillo administration. It sought to ensure that financial policy would keep domestic interest rates competitive [120: p.
112], while incentives were created for exports. For decades
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free trade was ‘the policy option that dare not speak its
name’ [78: p. 370].
In his inaugural address in December 1982 De La Madrid
declared “we are in an emergency” [57]. He outlined a tenpoint austerity program – Programa Inmediato de Reordenacion Economica (Program of Immediate Economic Reorganization) [121: p. 29]. He adopted a crisis management
approach, sending a draconian budget to Congress for a 50
percent reduction in the deficit [57]. The budgets of 19821984 represented a sustained attempt at austerity [53: p.
117].
De La Madrid pegged the peso at a more "realistic"
exchange rate and introduced plans to restructure the federal
bureaucracy. He set about implementing conventional
monetary and fiscal austerity, more extensive trade
liberalisation, and a less confrontational approach to the IMF
[43: p. 63]. The IMF Managing Director, Jacques De
Larosiere, and the Mexican finance minister, Silva-Herzog,
negotiated an adjustment program to restore the economy.
‘Acceptance of the IMF embrace is a major break-through’
[122: p. 1720], as it permitted Mexico avoid the dangers of a
debt moratorium [120: p. 121].
De La Madrid recognised that his administration could
not rely on oil’s exports [68]. Hernandez [38] argues that the
solution to financing the country’s development was sought
through privatising public enterprises, of which 1,155 were
sold off. De La Madrid sought to combine macroeconomic
stabilisation and structural change, with a focus on export
orientated manufacturing [53: p. 110]. This was part of the
overall objective of integrating Mexico into the world economy. De La Madrid disbursed power to the states, to foster
increased competitiveness within the country, and support
private industry and investment [123].
The initial adjustment package sought to ameliorate the
external debt through a reduction of government spending
and a one-time devaluation of the peso. This enabled Mexico
reach its IMF targets for reducing the public sector deficit
and limiting new public sector external indebtedness.
Unfortunately, the recessionary impact of this strategy was
more severe than anticipated, and much of the task of
economic adjustment was left to De La Madrid's successor
[116: p. 421].
The ideas underlying state-led development, based on
import substitution industrialisation collapsed. The
government ‘embraced an approach generally oriented
toward liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation’ [116: p.
421]. As an interviewee stated – the change from stabilising
development to neo-liberalism was radical.
These policies were to have an impact upon Mexico’s
future economic, and social, development [53: p. 84].
Mexico’s import substitution policies had been centred on
encouraging the internal market, while the new approach
focused on using international forces as promoters of
liberalisation [124]. However, a major concern was
Mexico’s inability to compete in foreign markets, and its
inadequate level of internal saving to finance growth [125].
De La Madrid’s administration signalled its desire to attract
new foreign investment by offering to relax restrictive FDI
laws. In February, 1984, the government issued guidelines
specifying new conditions under which officials could
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authorize majority foreign ownership of firms [53: p. 115].
Tournaud [44] stated that once this occurred Mexican
businesses began forging relationships with foreign firms.
According to Middlebrook [124] the relationship
between the private sector and the state transformed. The
neoliberal reforms made the private sector a key player in
reviving the economy. According to Hernandez [38] and
Tournaud [44] this was the main difference between De La
Madrid’s administration and those of his predecessors.
Business organisations became more actively engaged in
public debates over economic policy. For decades the private
sector had been kept at a distance by the PRI [97: p. 371].
De La Madrid’s approach focused on development with a
social objective, but based on economic reality [125].
According to Foucras [126] under De La Madrid all sections
of society gained a voice. Cárdenas [109] argues that this
would become an important factor in the movement of
national liberalisation started in the early 1980s, and strongly
embraced during De La Madrid’s presidency. For Rubio [40]
and Hernandez [38], political reform changed the country’s
social ideology.
Serra-Puche [39] and Cárdenas [109] argue that Mexican
economic history can be divided into before, and after, 1982.
Mexico started down a different path under De La Madrid
(1982-1988). The crisis saw the development of a new set of
policies. In the wake of crisis, and change in the ideas
underlying economic policy, Mexico experienced a thirdorder macroeconomic policy change. The market replaced
regulation, private ownership replaced public ownership, and
competition replaced protection [127: p. 85; 116: p. 421].
According to Hernandez [38] and Foucras [126], there was a
change in Mexico’s economic model, which culminated in
its accession to the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) in 1993.
Change in Swedish Macroeconomic Policy
The recession of the 1970s saw the Swedish budget deficits supporting the social welfare system deepen. By 1981
the non-socialist coalition government was only a minority
administration in the Riksdag [117]. Not surprisingly, the
Swedish Employers’ Federation (SAF) was unhappy with
the government over the state of the economy. However, the
non-socialist government displayed great indecisiveness in
relation to dealing with the economic malaise [80].
The only tangible result of the change of government in
Sweden in 1982 was an altered approach to economic management, with only minor changes in extant economic policies. The new SAP government, admitting there were no
ready solutions to the economy’s problems [85], implemented a recovery programme – The Third Road. This approach argued that renewed growth required redistribution of
income from labour to capital. It constituted a shift in SAP
economic planning, behind which course lay the influence of
its own research unit, as opposed to those of the unions. This
marked an attempt to maintain a level of social democracy,
which other countries were rolling back [128, p. 134]. The
Third Road sought to devise a wide-ranging stabilisation
programme that included demand management measures, as
well as initiatives to promote structural change and ensure
the fair distribution of the burden of adjustment [91: p. 21].
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The SAP was also determined to pour funds into job creating industries, and even to increase taxes for that purpose
[129]. The party planned to spend $100 million, and hoped
to attract an addition $350 million in private investment, in
order to create 30,000 new jobs [129]. The centrepiece of
Finance Minister Feldt’s strategy to boost corporate profits
was devaluation of the krona. This measure was implemented, in conjunction with a price freeze and increases in
sales and corporate taxes, in a sweeping “crisis plan” aimed
at stimulating the economy and correcting the fundamental
imbalances therein [130, 131]. According to the OECD [91,
p. 21] the objective was to achieve export-led, investment
driven, recovery. The SAP had identified labour costs as the
key to international competition. The country’s largest peak
trade union organization, the Landsorganisationen i Sverige
(LO) accommodated devaluation by demanding average
wage increases of only 2.5 percent in ensuing wage bargaining. However, the devaluation drew international opprobrium. “The danger of a chain reaction of beggar-thyneighbour policies with potentially disastrous consequences
is now greater that at any time since World War II,” said
Emil Van Lennep, secretary general of the OECD [132: p.
3]. The devaluation and international economic recovery
resulted in high earnings and excellent scope for export
expansion [133: p. 333].
The government also restored welfare entitlements cut by
the non-socialists [91: p. 23]. To maintain the welfare state
by whatever means necessary the government gave priority
to private sector growth, profits and market forces. It introduced a series of structural reforms that could be regarded as
redefining the traditional priorities of the SAP. Under pressure for more individual freedom, and the internationalisation of the economy, these reforms saw the SAP move in a
neo-liberal direction by the late 1980s [134]. Fiscal policy
was held tight, and the slimming of the public sector would,
it was argued, create crowding in effects [135: p. 349]. The
public sector austerity strategy, with a profit explosion and
wage restraint, was to create severe tension between the SAP
and its traditions ally the LO. Thus, in this case, the economic policy instrument settings changed, but the instruments of economic policy, and the goals behind it, remained
much the same: maintenance of the welfare state. This constituted a first-order policy change.
The economic crisis in Sweden generated significant debate and a form of ideational collapse occurred. However,
change agents did not consolidated around a replacement
economic orthodoxy. As a result, the extant economic paradigm endured, providing the existing economic policies with
sufficient protection to remain largely intact despite the criticisms. There was no critical juncture in economic policy in
Sweden in 1982.
Table 3.
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From Table 3 we can see that in the case of Mexico, the
macroeconomic policy instruments settings, instruments, and
hierarchy of goals behind macroeconomic policy, all
changed. This third order policy change occurred following
an economic crisis, the collapse of the dominant economic
orthodoxies, the introduction of new economic ideas into the
policy arena, and the consolidation of change agents around
these new ideas. Together, these three factors combined,
crisis, ideational change, and radical policy change, constituted a critical juncture in Mexican macroeconomic policy.
From Table 3 we can also see that in the case of Sweden
there was no critical juncture in macroeconomic policy. Although there was an economic crisis, and ideational collapse
occurred, change agents did not consolidate around a new
site of ideas with which to manage the Swedish economy. As
a consequence, the old orthodoxy on how to manage the
economy endured. The result was that the hierarchy of goals
behind Swedish economic policy continued on despite the
economy being in crisis.
CONCLUSION
We found a critical juncture in Mexican macroeconomic
policy in 1982. In the midst of an economic crisis calling
into question the economic viability of the state, economic
polices, having been undermined by previous failures, were
overcome by change agents, led by a political entrepreneur,
consolidating around a new set of ideas on how to manage
the economy. The ideational foundations of extant policy
collapsed in 1982 in the midst of the crisis. Import substitution and the restrictions imposed upon FDI were perceived
as failing strategies. In this context, De La Madrid assumed
the role of political entrepreneur, fostering an alternative set
of ideas on how to manage the economy. Around these ideas
change agents consolidated. These ideas involved a reversal
previous policy – opening the economy to free trade and
pursuing FDI. De La Madrid altered the setting, instruments,
and hierarchy of goals behind Mexican economic policy – a
third order policy change. Thus, there was a crisis, ideational
change, and radical change in macroeconomic policy in
Mexico, what the framework rates as a critical juncture in
macroeconomic policy.
In the case of Sweden there was no critical juncture in
macroeconomic policy in 1982. Although the economy was
in crisis, and this was undermining confidence in the economic orthodoxy that had dominated society for the preceding half century, neither the non-socialist parties, or their
SAP rivals, were willing to challenge this orthodoxy. Thus,
although ideational collapse occurred during the crisis, a
political entrepreneur willing to champion a new set of ideas
on how to manage the Swedish economy failed to emerge.
The result was that without such a figure, change agents, and
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The Observable Implications

Mex

Sw

O1. If economic policy instrument settings changed there may have been a radical change in economic policy

X

X

O2. If the instruments of economic policy changed there may have been radical change in economic policy

X

O3. If the hierarchy of goals behind economic policy changed there may have been a radical change in economic policy

X

Radical Change in Privatization Policy

Y

N
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any alternative ideas, were left floundering. Extant economic
policy went largely unchallenged as no alternatives were put
forward. There was only a first order policy change in Sweden at the time – a change to existing policy instrument setting. Thus, although there was a crisis, and ideational collapse, no new idea was consolidated, meaning there was no
ideational change. The result of this was that economic policy changed only slightly - thus there no critical juncture in
Swedish macroeconomic policy at this time.
These findings show that a critical juncture in
macroeconomic policy consists of three stages: macroeconomic crisis, ideational change, and radical policy
change. A macroeconomic crisis is a necessary, but, in itself,
insufficient, condition for a paradigm shift in
macroeconomic policy to occur. A macroeconomic crisis not
followed by ideational change, will not lead to a radical
change in macroeconomic policy - Sweden 1982. However,
a macroeconomic crisis followed by ideational change
(collapse of the extant orthodoxy and consolidation of a
new orthodoxy) will lead to a third order change in
macroeconomic policy, which combined constitutes a critical
juncture – Mexico 1982.
Thus, ideational change was very important in determining if third order macroeconomic policy change occurred in
the wake of the macroeconomic crises in Mexico and Sweden. Extant ideational orthodoxy protected existing policy,
ensuring its continuity. However, in the wake of the macro-

economic crises, ideational collapse occurred in both countries. Existing macroeconomic policies in both countries
were no longer protected, as their underlying ideas had been
undermined by failure. In Mexico change agents, led by a
political entrepreneur, consolidate around a new set of economic ideas, and injected these into the policy domain. The
result was a third order change in macroeconomic policy.
However, in Sweden change agents failed to consolidate
around a new economic orthodoxy, and existing ideas endured. As a result there was only a first order policy change
in Sweden. Political entrepreneur led consolidation around a
new set of economic ideas was the difference between an
economic crisis that lead to a critical juncture in macroeconomic policy (Mexico), and one that did not (Sweden). This
ties in with the argument that different network configurations are associated with different orders of policy change
[136: p. 771].
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APPENDIX A
Mexico’s Economic Indicators, 1972 – 1982
Year

Unemply
(%)

Inflation
(%)

Government Debt to
GNP ratio

Growth Rates in Real
GDP

Gross Capital
Formation % of GDP

1972

7

5

18.5

8.22

20.32

1973

7.3

12.04

19.31

7.86

21.39

1974

7.2

23.75

19.73

5.78

23.18

1975

7.2

15.15

21.17

5.74

23.69

1976

6.7

15.79

27.62

4.42

22.29

1977

8.8

29

39.18

3.38

22.84

1978

6.9

17.45

35.86

8.96

23.6

1979

5.7

18.17

32.79

9.69

25.95

1980

4.2

26.36

30.53

9.22

25.73

1981

4.2

27.93

32.59

8.77

25.94

1982

6.8

58.92

53.3

-0.63

21.56

1983

6.9

101.7

66.53

-4.2

19.77

Source: Data Gob. [WWW document]. URL http://www.iadb.org/DataGob/index.html; Mitchell, R. B. (2007) International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750-2005. 6th ed.
Macmillan: Basingstoke; Fleck, S. And Sorrentino, C. (1994) ‘Employment and Unemployment in Mexico’s Labour force’. Monthly Labour Review, November (3).
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APPENDIX B
Sweden’s Economic Indicators, 1972 – 1982
Year

Unemply
(%)

Inflation
(%)

Government Debt to
GNP ratio

Growth Rates in Real
GDP

Gross Capital
Formation % of GDP

1972

2.0

6.0

22.2

2.2

23.45

1973

2.5

6.7

22.6

3.9

22.65

1974

2.0

9.9

24.2

4.3

25.27

1975

1.6

9.8

24.4

2.2

25.71

1976

1.6

10.3

23.6

1.2

24.90

1977

1.8

11.4

26.5

-2.0

21.68

1978

2.2

10.0

31.8

1.3

18.69

1979

2.1

7.2

37.9

4.3

21.22

1980

2.0

13.7

43.2

1.9

22.60

1981

2.5

12.1

50.8

-0.6

19.61

1982

3.1

8.6

59.3

1.1

19.29

1983

3.5

9.0

64.6

1.8

19.02

Source: Data Gob. [WWW document]. URL http://www.iadb.org/DataGob/index.html; OECD, 1995. Labour Force Statistics. OECD: Paris; Statistical Annex of European Economy,
Spring 2003; Eurostat Yearbook 1997. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities; Mitchell, B. R., 1993. International Historical Statistics. Europe
1750-1988. (3rd ed.) Hong Kong: Stockton Press; Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002.
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